The Project

A distinctive feature of anti-corruption activity in the 90s is the level of regulatory and institutional innovation achieved. In addition to the role played by the traditional anti-corruption actors, we also witnessed the rise of new players, such as the anti-corruption agencies (ACAs).

Although the pioneers of these institutional units can be traced back in time, in the form of parliamentary commissions, inquiry committees, special police branches, anti-corruption leagues, the first ACAs date from the postcolonial period in the aftermath of World War II (1952, Singapore, Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau; 1967, Malaysia, Anti-Corruption Agency; 1974, Hong Kong SAR, Independent Commission Against Corruption). These early agencies were either created by the declining European powers as an attempt to clean-up the not-so-clean reputation of their colonial administrations or put in place by the new governments as a part of their endeavour, as independent states, to build a new administration rid of old habits and "corrupt" practices inherited from the colonial powers. Out of these, the Hong Kong ICAC, created in 1974, has been one of the most successful ventures and it has become a model to many others in the Anglo-Saxon world and beyond.

Since the end of the Cold War, the geographical location of these bodies has expanded from the developing to the developed world, from transitional to consolidated democracies, as corruption has started to be discussed and condemned beyond the stereotypical vision which previously restricted it to the southern hemisphere. Corruption went global, so to speak, and so did anti-corruption efforts. ACAs are often born out of a broad political consensus in a context of scandal and crisis, thus telling us much about the short existence of some of these bodies and/or their limited capacity to deliver results.

However, the domestic and international aspects of the creation of ACAs are increasingly intertwined. World institutions have incessantly recommended the creation of an ACA as an important piece in a country's institutional architecture and grand strategy against corruption. In Central and East European countries, ACAs have also been recommended as part of macro anti-corruption programmes with a view to EU membership. The Copenhagen criteria put forward reforms related to the functioning of the political sphere and the judiciary as a pre-condition to accession.

The format of these agencies and their success in keeping up with new forms of corruption vary greatly from one country to another. But there is also a good deal of institutional mimetism. On the one hand, the creation of ACAs was the product of specific patterns of legal and institutional development and of reactions to emerging challenges. Each agency is, in that respect, one of a kind. Some countries have endowed their agencies with the power to investigate and prosecute, whereas others have preferred a more preventive, educational and informative role. There are also differences with regard to their scope of action, resources, accountability requirements, etc. On the other hand, there has also been a convergence in the type of agency adopted. It may be improper to use the word model, but at least we could say that, since the late 1980s, we have witnessed an increasing transfer between countries of knowledge regarding the format of these bodies. Knowledge of the successes and failures in foreign experience and the importation of models already tested abroad is an important feature of this policy and institutional engineering process.

Independently of their format and powers, ACAs encounter various constraints to their mandate, which explains the meagre results obtained by some of them: 1) difficulties in unveiling corruption via complaints (technical, statutory and cultural); 2) difficulties in obtaining information about corruption and its opportunity structures from other state bodies/agencies and 3) difficulties in establishing a good working relationship with the political sphere. There is also a discrepancy between expected results and achievable ones that should not be ignored. Certain ACAs remain unknown to the wider public and do not anchor their anti-corruption/fraud role in civil society. This is partly due to their format and partly to a lack of understanding of the centrality of citizens in the whole process of control, given the obscure nature of these transactions.

These specialised bodies are an important object of study for various reasons. They are fairly new (the oldest is 54 years old); their numbers are increasing steadily; their establishment is often central to broader national anti-corruption programmes/strategies; they are oriented towards a single-issue: their sole mission is to combat corruption; they are an attempt by governments to overcome the insufficiency and/or inadequacy of conventional law enforcement agencies in coping with the growing sophistication of corrupt mechanisms and transactions as well as detecting and/or prosecuting complex corruption cases. In contrast to law enforcement agencies, ACAs have been designed to develop a preventive capacity and, at the same time, to generate a knowledge-based approach to corruption through research. In principle, these bodies are provided with a team of experts (whilst drawing knowledge and experience from and exchanging them with several other monitoring and regulatory units), an ample mandate, investigative powers, statutory autonomy and adequate funding to ensure that effective preventive steps are identified and put in place. In practice, however, the label "ACA" does not fit many of the realities encountered.

We do not yet know how long these agencies will exist. Will they remain permanent institutional features of the governmental structure or will they slowly disappear while conventional enforcement agencies become gradually more effective and regain public prestige and support? Will ACAs continue to expand to new countries or will the demand for these specialised agencies start to fade as the attention of world institutions moves away from corruption into other more pressing global problems? For all these reasons, it is important to try to understand the nature, capabilities and performance of these agencies and to make the results available to academics and practitioners working in and on the field. This is the objective we have committed ourselves to pursuing with the creation of ANCORAGE-NET.