Very briefly, I shall try to list a set of guiding principles that emerged both out of the discussions during the three-day conference and ongoing research on how to help ACAs overcoming some of the obstacles described above. It is not a question of offering a panacea, in that each specific case is a specific case, but it should be understood as a pro-active reflection. The remarks I am about to make are not directed simply to ACA officials, but also to decision-makers. They concern different stages of the process of institutionalization of ACAs.

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Corruption in the Eastern European and the CIS countries existed long before the process of transition and was rooted in the functions and structures of the communist system. Some of the characteristics of that system still have a bear on the degree and features of the corruption phenomenon in the region. With the fall of the Soviet Union and the beginning of the transition toward democracy and market economy, corruption became pervasive and acquired a large economic dimension. During the late nineties the countries of the region started introducing measures to fight corruption and creating anti-corruption agencies (ACAs). The paper will discuss these measures with particular focus on the reality of ACAs in the region in the context of the UN Convention Against Corruption. The main shortcomings of the anti-corruption systems and potential remedies will be analyzed from the perspective of UNDP's experience interacting with practitioners from ACAs in anti-corruption projects.

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For over 10 years, organisations such as the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and the Council of Europe (CoE) have been helping developing countries adopt legal measures to fight corruption. These efforts, however, have sometimes had less than the desired impact. The UN, OECD, and CoE conventions against corruption have been relatively ineffective because these conventions, while ratified by national parliaments, are not being implemented in the government agencies most prone to corruption – particularly the traffic police, security services, customs, and tax inspection.

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Corruption prevention is about intervening before the corrupt conduct occurs. To prevent corruption and other serious misconduct one needs to decide how and where are the best ways and places to intervene. This paper argues that research techniques provide tools for informing such decisions. The paper draws on actual examples of how social science research methods have been used within two Australian anti-corruption agencies to inform efforts to minimise future corruption. These examples are used to illustrate the following five observations: 1. Don’t rely on investigations to prevent corruption 2. Divide corruption into its specific forms 3. Consider your best information sources 4. Engage stakeholders about the recommendations 5. Monitor the implementation of the recommendations.

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In October 1951, 1,800 pounds of opium worth S$400,000 (US$133,330) was stolen by a gang of robbers, which included three police detectives. Furthermore, the Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) within the Singapore Police Force (SPF), which was responsible for combating corruption, found that some senior police officers were involved with both the robbers and importers of the opium. The ACB’s investigations resulted in the dismissal of a senior officer and the retirement of another. However, the British colonial government was dissatisfied with the outcome of the ACB’s investigation and formed a special team outside the SPF to investigate the opium hijacking scandal (Tan, 1999: 59). As the special team uncovered evidence of widespread police corruption, the British colonial government realized the importance of establishing an independent anti-corruption agency (ACA) outside the SPF. Accordingly, the ACB was replaced by the CPIB in October 1952, making the CPIB the first ACA to be created in Asia (Quah, 2003a: 114).

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Niklas Luhmann1 perguntou-se porque é que o indivíduo seria honesto no escuro? Porque assim ele o deseja ou porque há regras e procedimentos de controlo dos comportamentos? É natural que não se posa responder univocamente a esta questão. Mas é normal quer nos sirva de reflexão sobre a ética, a responsabilidade e a organização do Estado na actual sociedade. As causas e o contexto do fenómeno da corrupção são complexas, variadas e contingentes. Nesta apresentação, gostaríamos de referir algumas observações.

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This paper will consider the role of OLAF in the fight against EU fraud. It will examine its powers and its capacity to coordinate the activities of anti-fraud agencies in twenty seven member states and it will also consider the constraints which prevent it from operating in a more effective manner. The paper will also consider OLAF’s relationship with other transnational agencies such as Eurojust and Europol and will seek to highlight the degree of fragmentation which exists with a multiplicity of actors involved in the fight against fraud, a fragmented legal approach and the difficulties this presents in attempting to police sophisticated transnational frauds. The effect of EU expansion on this situation will also be considered and the support offered to new member states who have been asked to bring their anti-fraud structures up to the standards of existing members within a very short period of time will be examined. The efforts of the Czech Republic in seeking to build up anti-fraud structures and systems will be covered in some detail. The paper will seek to draw wider lessons which could be of benefit to prospective member states and to OLAF itself. The paper will conclude that despite the best efforts of the actors involved, a fragmented legal system and institutions are hampering the fight against fraud.

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People bribe, not companies. Companies only provide the framework within which an offence might take place, and sometimes the motive. Whilst compliance regimes and internal business process have major roles to play, ultimately it is one or more people in the company or organisation that will decide to act improperly, perhaps on impulse. Such circumstances may also foster other offences, especially fraud and anti competitive behaviour. Most of our understanding of bribery and corruption is gained from case studies and is therefore historic by nature. Furthermore it is possible that some evidence may remain undiscovered or is not admissible in court. It is therefore difficult to persuade companies and especially those that have not experienced an allegation, to take measures (where not already in place) to mitigate such risks. This presentation sets out to examine the reasons and circumstances behind the actions of the “One Bad Apple”, the process and managerial weaknesses that might prevail and how by looking before the event and from within an organisation, ACAs might take new investigatory approaches and work more closely with companies to develop preventive strategies.

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All over the world, cities have been developing measures, instruments and institutions in order to curb corruption and to stimulate the ethics and integrity of government (Behnke & Maesschalck, 2006; Frederickson & Ghere, 2005; Lewis & Gilman, 2005). Many things happen, many lessons could be learned from experiences with these ‘local integrity systems’ (LIS). Nevertheless, the discussion about local systems has been limited and the attempts to compare policies and institutions are virtually nonexistent.

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This paper examines two methods of investigating corruption within a public sector environment. The first is the law enforcement method where the investigation complies with accepted practices such as the right of silence and the prevention of self incrimination. The second is the use of coercive powers – where privilege, the right of self incrimination and the right of silence are removed. This removal is generally accompanied by some protection against using the material in criminal matters. The paper explores the single agency model of corruption investigation where investigation, prevention, research and education are within the agency. It compares this model to a multiple agency model where an investigation or prevention/education functions link with other investigative agencies such as an Ombudsman, External Review Panel, an Auditor General or law enforcement agencies.

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In 2007, both Moldovan and Ukrainian authorities took firm steps to reduce corruption along the Transnistrian border. This paper – aimed mainly at anti-corruption practitioners and scholars in public administration – discusses the background and underlying principles guiding the anti-corruption work being adopted by both governments in order to facilitate discussion about optimal anti-corruption programme design. This paper presents a set of tools used during the planning phase of the anti-corruption programme -- outlining the methodology used to assess the extent of corruption on the Transnistrian border, the problems of legislative transplants, a “contract test” for defining corruption offenses, a method of risk analysis, and a model of optimal anti-corruption programme organizational design.

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The "preventative" aspects of anti-corruption work as called for in the recent UN Convention Against Corruption remain very difficult to define and operationalise – particularly for ACAs. This session – and the accompanying paper – will discuss how some ACAs have been using research to implement evidence-based prevention programmes. The session will cover how ACAs have assigned staff to do theoretical and empirical research (particularly related to survey-based data collection). The session will also cover simple and specific statistical and econometric methods used to test the effectiveness of particular investigative, prosecutorial and awareness raising methods. The session will also cover how empirical research translates into operating procedure and even recommendations for changes in the national anti-corruption legislative framework. Methods of information sharing between EU member states and with third-party states will be discussed and implications for EU-level institutions (such as OLAF) will serve as the lynch-pin of the session.

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Anticorruption agencies are usually created when corruption has spread so widely and the police are so corrupt that offences of bribery are no longer investigated or prosecuted. In a desperate attempt to stop the rot the government establishes the anticorruption agency, half believing that the problem will then disappear. New laws, new corruption offences, more severe penalties, a new agency but still the problem gets worse. Many of these agencies fail dismally to have any impact. Very few can be said to have succeeded at all. Why?

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